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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we discuss pros and cons of different models for financial market
regulation and supervision and we present a proposal for the re-organisation of
regulatory and supervisory agencies in the Euro Area. Our arguments are consistent
with both new theories and effective behaviour of financial intermediaries in
industrialized countries. Our proposed architecture for financial market regulation is
based on the assignment of different objectives or "finalities" to different authorities,
both at the domestic and the European level. According to this perspective, the three
objectives of supervision – microeconomic stability, investor protection and proper
behaviour, efficiency and competition – should be assigned to three distinct
European authorities, each one at the centre of a European system of financial
regulators and supervisors specialized in overseeing the entire financial market with
respect to a single regulatory objective and regardless of the subjective nature of the
intermediaries. Each system should be structured and organized similarly to the
European System of Central Banks and work in connection with the central bank
which would remain the institution responsible for price and macroeconomic
stability.  We suggest a plausible path to build our 4-peak regulatory architecture in
the Euro area.
^ The opinions expressed are only those of the authors and do not necessarily coincide with
those of the Institutions they are affiliated with. Giorgio Di Giorgio gratefully acknowledges financial
support from MURST.
3I.     INTRODUCTION
     Financial markets have significantly developed in the last decades throughout industrialized
countries. This path is evident with regard to intermediaries, capital markets and financial
instruments.  Structural changes have mainly involved the more traditional financial operators in
banking, but have also interested investment firms and insurance companies.
Accordingly, also the regulatory and supervisory1 a rangements of the financial system have
been modified in  many countries. As a matter of fact, the topic is still at the centre of a lively debate,
and the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, France and Japan are currently either
undertaking or implementing radical reforms of their regulatory systems. In other European
countries, evolutionary trends are moving in the same direction. Moreover, with the start of Phase III
of the EMU, the responsibility for monetary policy in the Euro zone has been assigned to the
European Central Bank, while banking and financial supervision tasks have been left to domestic
agencies. A relevant novelty in Europe is then “the abandonment of the coincidence between the area
of jurisdiction of monetary policy and the area of jurisdiction of banking supervision”2. The “double
separation” (geographical and functional) between central banking and banking supervision, and the
absence of any explicit reference to “who takes care of financial stability” in Europe, have cast some
doubts about the efficacy of the current regulatory arrangements in preventing and managing
financial crisis and are currently stimulating discussion in both academic and institutional circles.
At the same time, the increasing integration of financial markets and especially the
(attempted) alliances among exchanges raise the question of whether the creation of a European
SEC (Karmel, 1999, Wise Men, 2000) is likely and desirable. Furthermore, the increasing cross-
border mergers among banks, securities and insurance firms, highlight the difficulties of keeping
regulation and supervision at a national level, possibly with different agencies in charge of banks,
securities and insurance firms.
At the EU level, the Financial Services Action Plan (COM 1999, 232, 11.5.1999) maps out a
first set of improvements to the EU legislative framework for securities markets. In the meanwhile
the Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of European Securities Markets has been appointed
by the Council of the European Union in July 2000 and released its Initial Report (Wise Men, 2000)
on November 9th, 2000, indicating a 4-step approach to make improvements in the EU regulation of
securities markets (broad framework principles; implementation of these principles through a new
                                         
1 Regulation deals with the formation of rules, primary and secondary: generally, primary rules are part of legislation
and thus are approved by national Parliaments while secondary rules may be implemented by administrative bodies
such as agencies. Supervision deals with the enforcement of rules both ex ante (control) and ex post (sanctions).
2 Padoa Schioppa, 1999.  On the pros and cons of separating monetary policy and banking supervisory tasks see Di
4EU Securities Committee; implementation of Community law by Member States within the
framework of strenghtened cooperation and networking between national regulators; stronger work
by the EU Commission to ensure open and fair competition in the European financial markets).
The objective of the present work is to set up a proposal for the reorganization of regulatory
arrangements and supervisory agencies in financial markets in the European Union.
The paper starts with a section investigating objectives and theoretical models for the
regulation of the financial system3. We then describe recent evolutionary dynamics in financial
markets, intermediaries and instruments and we argue that the current domestic-based and different
frameworks for financial market regulation in a single currency area are not appropriate.
Hence, we present a proposal for a new configuration for supervising the domestic financial
market through the assignment of different objectives or "finalities" to different authorities. This
perspective would thus entrust the attainment of the three objectives of supervision on the entire
financial market -- stability, proper behaviour and investor protection (transparency), competition --
to three distinct authorities regardless of the subjective nature of the intermediaries, whether they be
in banking, finance or insurance4. It would highlight the objective of competition in the financial
sector as an important finality explicitly monitored by the regulator. For the sake of consistency, the
existing rules applying to other forms of financial intermediation would be extended to include the
life insurance sector.
The natural choice to make is between centralized or decentralized regulation. After
discussing the pros and cons of the two approaches, we suggest a two-level architecture for financial
market regulation which is inspired by the current organization of the European System of Central
Banks. We suggest to establish a European System of Financial Regulators, with three distinct
independent authorities (plus the ECB) at the European level.  These agencies ought to be
characterized by homogeneous procedures in terms of their creation, functioning and funding. They
will push and coordinate the work of the three corresponding national authorities in each member
country.  At both the European and domestic level, a coordination committee would be the site for
resolving conflicts and controversies.
An important issue in our proposal for a regulatory reform in the Euro area concerns the
problem of who takes care of financial stability from a macroeconomic point of view in the Euro
                                                                                                                              
Noia and Di Giorgio (1999).
3 See also Goodhart and Shoenmaker, 1992; Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994; Merton and Bodie, 1995; Goodhart 1996;
White, 1997; Llewellyn (1999).
4 The reference is, in the following, to life-insurance, whose behaviour is very close to the other financial
intermediaries.
5area. We re-examine the matter of the need for a lender of last resort and of the proper relationship
of the European Central Bank with other financial market regulators.
The paper is organized as follows. In section II we describe the objectives and the
motivations for  financial markets regulation and we identify four models of regulatory structure. In
section III we deal with the regulatory frameworks currently in place in the Euro area and we argue
that these are not suitable in a single-currency highly integrated area.  We then present in section IV
our hypothesis of reform based on a fully coherent application of the supervisory model by objectives
(or by finality). Finally, we summarize our conclusions.
II.  MODELS FOR FINANCIAL MARKET REGULATION AND SUPERVISION.
II.1 Financial Market Regulation.
The theoretical underpinning for public intervention in economic matters is traditionally based
on the need to correct market imperfections and unfair distribution of the resources. Three more
general objectives of public intervention derive thereby: the pursuit of stability, equity in the
distribution of resources and the efficient use of those resources.
The regulation of the financial system can be viewed as a particularly important case of public
control over the economy. The accumulation of capital and the allocation of financial resources
constitute an essential aspect in the process of the economic development of a nation. The
peculiarities of financial intermediation and of the operators who perform this function justify the
existence of a broader system of controls with respect to other forms of economic activity. Various
theoretical motivations have been advanced to support the opportunity of a particularly stringent
regulation for banks and other financial intermediaries. Such motivations are based on the existence
of particular forms of market failure in the credit and financial sectors5 .
The objectives of financial market regulation.
The definition of the term 'financial market' has traditionally included the banking, financial
and insurance segments. The bounds dividing institutions, instruments and markets were clear-cut, so
that further distinctions were drawn within the different classes of intermediaries (with banks
                                         
5 White (1996) identifies certain categories of "market failure", describing them with special regard for the financial
markets: i) situations of market power brought about because of collusion, concentration, technological conditions or
public regulatory conditions; ii) economies of scale, as in the case of capital markets where an inverse relation exists
between the volume of transactions and the costs of transaction; iii) externality (spillover) effects, as in the case of a
bank failure generally affecting the confidence of savers in the entire banking system; iv) public good problems, as in
the case of the property of prices formed on the exchanges; v) information asymmetries, typically found among buyers
and sellers of financial products; vi) individuals who are unable to know their own best interest, as in the case of forms
of savings they are "unacquainted with" present in financial markets.
6specialized in short or medium/long term maturities, functional/commercial operations, deposits and
investments; with financial intermediaries handling broker-dealer negotiations, asset management and
advisory functions, and with insurance companies dealing in life and other insurance policies). These
distinctions were mirrored in the regulatory structure with different agencies for banks (often the
Central Bank), securities and insurance firms at a national and international level (Basel Committee
for Banking Superviosion, International Organization of Securities Commissions, IOSCO,  and the
International Association of Insurance Supervisors, IAIS).
 In this essay, as the bounds dividing the various types of financial institutions are becoming
increasingly blurred (Corrigan, 1987), we shall refer to the financial market as an economic space
wherein operators of various kinds -- banks, financial intermediaries, mutual funds, insurance
companies, pension funds -- offer financial instruments and services.
A primary objective of financial market regulation is the pursuit of macroeconomic and
microeconomic stability. Safeguarding of the stability of the system translates into macrocontrols
over currencies, interest rates and payment systems which are functions, together with the lender of
last resort function typical of the entities which are in charge of monetary policy: the central banks.
Measures pertaining to the microstability (prudential regulation) of the intermediaries can be
subdivided into two categories: general rules on the stability of all business enterprises and
entrepreneurial activities, such as the legally required amount of capital, borrowing limits and
integrity requirements; and more specific rules due to the special nature of financial intermediation,
such as risk-based capital ratios, limits to portfolio investments and the regulation of off-balance
activities, the managing of deposit insurance funds or investor compensation schemes. Furthermore
micro-stability controls can be directed to the financial exchanges, clearing houses and securities
settlement systems.
A second objective of financial regulation is transparency in the market and of intermediaries
and investor protection. This is linked to the more general objective of equity in the distribution of
the available resources and may be mapped into the search for "equity in the distribution of
information as a precious good" among operators.6 At the macro level, transparency rules impose
                                         
6 One of the classic instances of market failure is relative to the presence of information asymmetries. However, so
recent theories of financial intermediation (Allen and Santomero, 1997) seem to go beyond theories based on
information: a look at reality in fact shows that while transaction costs and asymmetric information have greatly
decreased, the activity of intermediation has considerably increased.  Financial markets seem to be more and more
markets for intermediaries than for investors or firms. The nature of all financial intermediaries (not only banks, but
also mutual funds, financial intermediaries, financial firms, pension funds) seems to be that of operators who perform
risk management activities on behalf of third parties and decrease the "costs of participation" in the financial market:
these two aspects have not yet been the object of in-depth analysis by intermediation theorists.  These same two
motivations are thought to contribute to the building of long-term relationships between intermediaries and customers
in such a way that the latter avoid ex ante research costs by simply buying the implicit insurance supplied by the
7equal treatment (for example, rules regarding takeovers and public offers) and the correct
dissemination of information (insider trading, manipulation and, more generally, the rules dealing
with exchanges microstructure and price-discovery mechanisms). At the micro level, such rules aim
at non-discrimination in relationships among intermediaries and different customers (conduct of
business rules).
A third objective of financial market regulation, linked with the general objective of
efficiency, is the safeguarding and promotion of competition in the financial intermediation sector.
This requires rules for controlling the structure of competition in the markets and, at the micro level,
regulations in the matter of concentrations, cartels and abuse of dominant positions.
Specific controls over financial intermediation are justified by the forms that competition can
assume in that field. They are related to the promotion of competition as well as to limiting possible
destabilizing excesses generated by competition itself.7
II.2 Financial Market Supervisory Models.
There is neither a unique theoretical model nor just one practical approach to the regulation
and supervision of financial markets. Significant differences are found in the literature in terms of
both definition and classification of regulatory models and techniques.
We identify four approaches for financial market supervision and regulation: "institutional
supervision", "supervision by objectives", "functional supervision" and "single-regulator supervision".
 Institutional supervision.
In the more traditional "institutional approach" (also known as "sectional" or "by subjects" or
"by markets"), supervision is performed over each single category of financial operator (or over each
single segment of the financial market) and is assigned to a distinct agency for the entire complex of
activities.  In this model, which follows the traditional segmentation of the financial system into three
markets, we thus have three supervisory authorities acting as watchdogs over, respectively, banks,
financial intermediaries and mutual funds, and insurance companies (and the corresponding markets).
The authorities control intermediaries and markets through entry selection processes (e.g.,
authorizations and enrolling procedures in special registers), constant monitoring of the business
activities (controls, inspections and sanctions) and eventual exits from the market (suspensions or
removal)8 .
                                                                                                                              
intermediaries (Allen and Gale, 1998).
7 On more than one occasion the European Commission has reaffirmed the applicability to financial markets of the
general regulation on competition. The Court of Justice has also upheld such orientation.
8 As an example of the institutional approach, one can consider the regulatory system provided for the insurance
8“Institutional” regulation facilitates the effective realization of controls, being performed with
regards to subjects that are regulated as to every aspect of their activity and as to all the objectives of
regulation. Each intermediary and market has only one supervisory authority as a counterpart. The
latter, in turn, is highly specialized.  As a result, duplication of controls is avoided and the costs of
regulation can be considerably reduced.
The institutional approach seems to be particularly effective in cases of intermediaries of a
very similar type and that do operate in just one of the three traditional segments of financial
intermediation.  Vice versa, the institutional model may give rise, in the presence of more subjects
entitled to perform the same financial intermediation activities9, to distortions in the supervisory
activity caused by the enforcement of different dispositions for operations of the same nature that are
executed by different entities. The disadvantages of this approach are represented by the previously
mentioned trend toward multiple-sector activities and by the progressive de-specialization of the
intermediaries. In turn, these phenomena are connected to the growing integration of both markets
and instruments, that frequently leads to the building of large financial conglomerates.  In a context
where the boundaries separating the various institutions are progressively being erased, it is no
longer possible to establish whether a particular subject is a bank, a non-banking intermediary or an
insurance company; or whether a group is involved more in one or another of such activities.
Therefore, there is the risk that "parallel" systems of intermediaries may be created, reflecting the
diversity of the respective control authorities. In this case, the way the controls are set up may
become a destabilizing rather than stabilizing factor. Moreover, the intermediaries might be induced
to choose their juridical status in a way which is contingent on the different rules that discipline
different subjects.
A further possible element of weakness in the model lies in the fact that when a single
authority supervises a category of subjects and pursues more than one objective, the result of the
control activity might not be effective in the event that different objectives are in conflict10 .
                                                                                                                              
market and intermediaries in many European countries by specific Insurance Supervisory Agencies.
9 Consider the negotiating activity in the stock exchange performed by both banks and financial intermediaries, or else
the gathering of savings realized by life insurance companies, similar to that undertaken by mutual funds.
10 The classic example is the trade-off between the objective of stability and that of competition. In Italy for example
the two tasks are under the responsibility of the central bank in the banking sector, a striking anomaly which is
unique in the Euro area. We do not think that there is any motivation nowadays to give antitrust responsibility in
banking to a different institution from the one (l’Autorità Garante per la Concorrenza ed il Mercato) that controls
over this feature in all other economic sectors.  The original rationale was to be found in the fact that the Antitrust
Authority was established only recently in Italy (1990). In absence of such an institution, the possibility that dominant
coalitions and excessive market power could arise in the banking sector was considered too dangerous and justified
the assignment of the task of preserving competition in the market to the already existing institution controlling the
banking system for prudential supervision.  Today, however, no reason remains to assign the same objective of
regulation to different Institutions in different sectors. Moreover, it is logically incoherent to assign responsibility for
9Supervision by objectives.
The supervisory model by objectives (or by finalities) postulates that all intermediaries and
markets be subjected to the control of more than one authority, each single authority being
responsible for one objective of regulation regardless of both the legal form of the intermediaries and
of the functions or activities they perform. According to this scheme, an authority, different from the
Central Banks, in charge for monetary policy and macro-stability, is to watch over prudential
regulation and micro-stability of both markets and all intermediarries, whether in banking, finance or
insurance; another authority will be responsible for the transparency of financial markets and will
control the behaviour of banks, financial intermediaries and insurance companies toward customers;
a third authority will guarantee and safeguard competition over the entire financial market and
among intermediaries11 .
The basic advantage of this 4-peak model (recently chosen in Australia) lies in the fact that it
is particularly effective in a highly-integrated market context and in the presence of polifunctional
operators, conglomerates and groups operating in a variety of different business sectors. At the same
time, it does not require an excessive proliferation of control units.
The most attractive feature of this scheme is that it provides uniform regulation for the
different entities engaged in the same activities: for examples ATS and exchanges, banks issuing
bonds.
Compared to the "institutional" model, a regulatory framework organized by objectives may
produce a certain degree of multiplication of the controls. And sometimes it could lead to a lack of
certain controls.  Indeed, the specific assignment of competencies with respect to the objectives of
regulation is not necessarily univocal and all-inclusive in practice. In such a model, each intermediary
is subject to the control of more than one authority, and this may be more costly. The intermediaries
might in fact be required to produce several reports relating to supervision, often containing identical
or similar information.  At the same time, the intermediaries may have to justify the same action to a
                                                                                                                              
competition in one sector to the same institution that is responsible for the stability of the same sector. An obvious
conflict emerges between the two objectives. As a matter of fact, in many of the M&A operations in the Italian
banking sector, the opinions of the Antitrust Authority (which are not compelling) and those of the Bank of Italy have
been opposite (Cafagna and Sciolli, 1996).  The Authority which is responsible for the stability of the system could
indeed have a regulatory bias for the protection of firms that should be left to exit the market. The usual motivation of
the risk of contagion and of investors protection would be advocated.  However, we think that the risk of contagion is
not necessarily and inevitably linked to all single bank crisis. Moreover, this risk could be countered with other
instruments, including more transparency and information diffusion in the market.
11 In the Italian system, the supervisory model by objectives has found application, at least nominally, in the Finance
Law “Testo Unico delle disposizioni in materia di intermediazione finanziaria” (DL 58/1998) where it is established,
with reference to intermediaries, that the competent authority in the matter of risk containment and financial stability
is the Banca d'Italia, while the Consob is responsible for transparency and proper behavior, but only with reference to
investment services.
10
whole set of authorities contemporaneously, even though for different reasons.  Vice versa, a deficit
of controls might occur whenever the exact areas of responsibility are not clearly identifiable in
specific cases.
Functional  Supervision.
The third regulatory model is the so-called "functional supervision”, or supervision “by
activity".  It considers as "given" the economic functions performed in the financial system; unlike
other lines of thought regarding supervisory activities, this approach does not postulate that existing
institutions, whether operative12 or r gulatory13 , must necessarily continue to exist as such, in terms
of both their structure and role.  The "functions" or activities undertaken are considered to be more
stable than the institutions that perform them. Competition among financial systems is thought to
drive existing institutions to evolve in a dynamic perspective in the direction of new and more
efficient forms.
According to Merton and Bodie (1995), the financial system is considered to perform six
basic functions:
- to provide ways of clearing and settling payments in order to facilitate trade;
- to provide a mechanism for the pooling of resources and for portfolio diversification;
- to provide ways of transferring economic resources through time, across borders, and among
industries;
- to provide ways of managing risks;
- to provide price information to help coordinate decentralized decision making in the various sectors
of the economy;
- to provide ways of dealing with the incentive problems created when one party in a transaction has
information that the other party does not have or when one party acts as agent for another.
In the functional supervisory model, each type of such financial services should be regulated
by a given authority independently of the operator who offers it. Hence, also this approach has the
important advantage that it calls for the same rules to be applied to intermediaries who perform the
same activity of financial intermediation even though such operators may fall into different categories
from a legal standpoint.  For example, activities including investment management, the gathering of
deposits, lending, and savings invested in insurance/retirement funds are each subject to
homogeneous rules established by individual authorities, which independently supervise such
                                         
12 Banks, mutual funds, intermediation firms, insurance companies and other financial intermediaries.
13 Bodies for controlling stability, supervisory organs to guarantee transparency, antitrust authorities and other
supervisory agencies.
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activities regardless of the institutions engaged. This approach fosters economies of specialization
within the supervisory authorities and might represent a rather attractive solution for the regulation
of integrated, advanced financial markets. However, it is not without drawbacks. This model
envisions an overlapping of bodies controlling the same subject: there is the risk of an excessive
division of competencies among the regulatory agencies.14
A further disadvantage of the functional approach is that finally what is subject to failure is
not the activity performed, but the institution.  In case of serious problems of stability, it would be
essential to guarantee protection and oversight with regard to the institutions rather than to
individual operations (Padoa-Schioppa, 1988).
"Single-regulator supervision”.
The single-regulator supervisory model is based on just one control authority, separated from
the central bank, and with responsibility over all markets and intermediaries regardless of whether in
the banking, financial or insurance sector. This authority would be concerned with all the objectives
of regulation (stability, transparency and investor protection, maybe competition).
In the regulatory practice, the centralized supervisory model has typically characterized early
stages of financial system development, often in periods when the central bank was the only
institution that supervised the activity of financial intermediaries. Faced in recent times with the
globalization and integration of the markets, the English brought this model back into being with the
creation of the Financial Services Authority - FSA (See Briault, 1999).15  The British executive's
decision to merge the preexistent supervisory authorities – part of the Central Bank staff, the
Securities Investment Board, the directorship of the Department of Trade and Industry competent in
the insurance field and the Security Regulatory Organizations (SROs) -- in the FSA is based on the
search for a more efficient organization of regulatory activities including a reduction in the costs of
                                         
14 Oldfield and Santomero (1997) view financial institutions as a set including banks, insurance companies,
investment companies (open and closed funds, other forms of collective investment, pension funds), origination firms
(investment firms, credit institutions, insurance brokers and financial promoters), market-makers (specialists, dealers
and reinsurance companies), stock exchanges (cash and derivatives), clearing houses and other financial operators.
The services provided by these financial institutions can be classified in six different activities: origination
(identification, evaluation and creation of financial activities originating with the customers of an institution),
distribution (the collection of funds through the sale of new financial products), servicing (the management of
payments flow from financial activities issuers to holders), packaging (pooling and tailoring of financial activities to
fit the specific needs of customers through greater personalization of goods and services offered), intermediating
(setting up of financial activities and contemporaneous buy-back of different financial activities on the part of the same
intermediary), market making (purchase or sale of financial activities).  In a regulatory perspective this taxonomy
might lead to an arrangement wherein every activity would correspond to a different supervisory activity.
15 The single-regulator model was first developed in Scandinavia (Denmark, Norway and Sweden) more than a decade
ago. See Taylor and Fleming (1999).
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regulation itself. Also, it was considered useful to have just one agency accountable to the Parliament
and to the market16 .
The advantages of this approach lie in the economies of scale that it produces. Fixed costs
and logistical expenses, the costs of administrative personnel and the compensation for the top
management are all considerably reduced. Moreover, this scheme calls for a unified view which is
particularly useful and effective with respect to polifunctional groups and conglomerates.  By the
same token, the costs of supervision charged to the subjects regulated and/or to the taxpayer
decrease, and there is less room for “regulatory arbitrage”.
However, the validity of this model depends to a high degree on its internal organization: if
the numerous areas of competence and specialization are not well-structured and coordinated, the
risk is to slow the decision-making process.  As underlined by Wilson (1989), what counts is a clear
definition of the agency's "mission".  Also, the presence of a sole regulator might render collusive
relations more immediate and direct (“regulatory capture”). Finally, it might exacerbate problems of
self-contradiction in the event that the authority should find itself forced to pursue conflicting
supervisory objectives.  This sort of problem might in part be overcome thanks to an internal
organization divided "by objectives", but the fact that there is only one top management would end
up in the prevalence of a single objective as final consequence of the decision-making process.
II.3  Is There an Optimal Model for Supervision?
Our presentation of the main regulatory models of the financial system should have made
clear how hard it is to establish which alternative offers a decisively superior arrangement.  In real
life we find a prevalence of "mixed" approaches which borrow in heterogeneous fashion elements
that are proper to more than just one model.
The institutional model could be considered a good candidate only in a context with rigidly
separated financial segments, and where no global players are at stake. Nowadays, we think that this
picture does not apply to the major advanced countries, where we do observe high integration in
financial markets and intermediaries and a strong presence of polifunctional groups and
conglomerates.
The most evident problems with regard to the functional supervisory model are the following:
i) it might call for too many regulators, corresponding to the numerous functions and activities that
the intermediaries perform; ii) it does not explicitly address questions regarding the stability (possible
failures) of the single institutions.
                                         
16 The costs of the FSA are funded directly by the market through a system of contributions and taxes charged to the
13
Hence, we think that modern financial systems should rely on either a single regulator or
independent agencies, each one responsible for one of the three objectives of regulation.
However, we are particularly concerned with the possible conflict of interest in pursuing
different objectives when these are assigned to the same agency. Clearly, the "single-regulator"
model is truly affected by the possible incompatibility among the supervisory objectives.17 In the
credit sector, for instance, we find a clear trade-off between competition and stability (at least in the
short run). The need to safeguard stability led, particularly in moments of economic and financial
tension, to the use of instruments designed to limit competition, such as institutional barriers to entry
in the market, or to the legal imposition of limits to operative activities. In financial systems where
banks are prevalent but not efficient enough to compete cross-border, the objective of competition is
usually sacrificed more easily than that of macroeconomic stability.  The consequence is a “stable”
environment in terms of the number and identity of the intermediaries. But this is obtained by altering
the free play of competition through measures that prevent exit of inefficient actors from the market.
Another case is that of the possible conflict between the objectives of stability and
transparency. Again with regard to the banking sector, scarce transparency in fund gathering
activities (e.g., in the issue of securities) might allow the application of interest rates below market
rates.  Such behavior could be considered functional to the strengthening of the stability of banks,
but it would result in direct injury to investors.
The most immediate response to this important problem might be to attribute to different
authorities different objectives of supervision, that is to adopt the regulatory model by objectives as
the benchmark for advanced financial systems. This solution could be designed so as to avoid an
excessive proliferation of authorities and thus limit the increase in both direct and indirect costs of
regulation18 .  This solution, in order to be effective and to avoid the conflict of interest among the
different objectives, should be accompanied by a coordination committee participated by the
members of the three different authorities and, eventually, of the central bank.
III.  CURRENT REGULATORY ARRANGEMENTS IN THE EURO AREA
III.1  Integration Among Intermediaries, Markets and Instruments.
                                                                                                                              
supervised institutions.
17 Moreover, the single- regulator model could also lead to excessive concentration of regulatory powers.
18 The literature available to date is not vast. See Franks, Schaefer and Staunton (1997) for an empirical work on the
direct and indirect costs of the regulation of financial markets, which among other things evidences the absence of
14
As already mentioned, banking, securities and insurance segments are becoming increasingly
integrated in terms of markets, intermediaries and financial instruments. The boundaries separating
banking, securities and insurance activities are in fact on their way out in most developed financial
systems because of the strong process of technological, geographical and functional integration
among these three sectors; and as a consequence of the de-specialization of the intermediaries. The
"reserved activities" that characterized financial operators by type are constantly decreasing at both
the normative and operative level.  As a matter of fact the traditional tripartite division of the
financial market failed to take into consideration that the creation and allocation of savings among
sectors with a cash surplus and sectors with a cash deficit were basically unitary phenomena: hence,
a unitary view of financial intermediation and its regulation should be adopted.
In the Euro area, the processes of integration within the financial market have come about in
a rather articulated fashion and following quite heterogeneous paths.
As regards the intermediaries, ownership integration has been accentuated, coming about
through the transfer of capital shares among institutions, or among controlling and controlled firms,
through an increasing number of M&As and through the establishment of new alliances directed to
diversify, either geographically or functionally, the business.19 Even though the process is still
characterized by a dominant share of domestic deals, cross-border operations have recently become
more important and are likely to develop further in the near future.  The prominent role of traditional
banks in continental Europe is currently being challenged by the advances in information and delivery
technology and the entry of new and aggressive players in the financial industry. While the former
has the main effect of lowering barriers to entry in the banking and financial industry, the latter
contribute to erode banks’ monopoly and comparative advantages in information, monitoring,
delivery capacity and processing by tending to specialize in particular segments of the financial
business (brokerage on-line, retail insurance and financial services), and/or targeting certain
categories of customers. The existence of more severe regulation in banking has also the
consequence that banks meet more difficulties in diversifying their activities out of finance, with
respect to the new entrants in the banking business. At the same time, less protection is gradually
given to traditional banks as the process of de-regulation gains power and support in the industry.
                                                                                                                              
research on the benefits of regulation.
19 A peculiar form of integration among intermediaries might also be detected in the transformation of their legal
status, even when continuing to perform basically the same intermediation activities as before. This occurred in
particular with investment firms which have been legally transformed into banks in countries where banks have
traditionally benefited from competitive rents due to higher regulatory protection; and even though such firms did not
have as their primary objective the issue of deposits or the provision of loans.  The reasons for this "arbitrage" among
legally diverse forms include the access to credit of last resort and to the interbank liquidity market, the possibility of
directly managing customers’ liquidity, the concerns about a sounder image ("too bank to fail"), the differing
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European financial market liberalization did also start a deep process of business restructuring in the
banking sector. The search for scale economies led to a reduced number of banks and a considerable
increase in market concentration. Financial conglomerates and complex groups have become
gradually more important and tend to act more and more on an international basis and at a European
and global level.
The role of insurance companies as financial intermediaries is also constantly increasingly,
thanks to contracts involving life insurance and capitalization, whose services are directly tied to
investment funds or to stock exchange or other financial indices (so-called unit-linked or index-
linked contracts). Nowadays, the inclusion of the life insurance segment among those activities
subject to financial regulation is something accepted in the major financial systems. Over the last few
years, market changes have actually lessened the distinctiveness of some schemes of life insurance
compared to other financial products.20
As regards the markets, considerable integration has taken place between the
banking/insurance markets and the securities markets. In many countries, this occurred by virtue of
the issue and quotation on the stock exchanges or other securities markets of both banks and
insurance companies.21 Also financial products and instruments have experienced a certain degree of
integration, as many of these - even when keeping the same legal status - have rapidly either partially
or totally changed their economic function. This is due to both exogenous factors -- such as fiscal
considerations, or different regulations applied to similar financial tools – and to endogenous factors
-- such as the different behavior of sellers and buyers (here we refer in particular to certificates of
                                                                                                                              
modalities for crisis management, and different regulatory costs and different supervisory authorities to deal with.
20 In the English system, for instance, long-term life insurance contracts are included in the notion of investment
(financial instruments) as provided by the Financial Services Act of 1986. This law and its implementing rules
regulate the selling of long-term business (life and pensions, see also Boléat, 1998). Insurance companies have the
same treatment of unit trusts in terms of their selling activity. The recent establishment of the FSA will further reduce
the distinctiveness of insurance companies by applying a common regulation to all financial institutions. In the U.S.
system, variable annuities and variable life insurance contracts whose yield is tied to “separate accounts”23 fall under
the Investment Company Act of 1940, which provides the general guidelines relative to investment activities,
reinvestment, and the buying and selling of financial securities. Besides, as contract owners assume certain investment
risks under variable contracts, the contracts are securities under the Securities Act of 1933. In the Euro area, on the
contrary, insurance companies are generally excluded from the set of rules that apply to banks and to other financial
intermediaries. In most countries life insurance policies are not considered financial instruments and insurance
companies are not authorised to perform investment services. Although there is an increasing tendency to recognise
the high degree of contiguity between certain insurance products and typical financial products, the regulatory
differences remain significant and insurance companies are supervised and controlled by a specialized supervisory
authority (with the exception of Austria and Ireland where responsibility is given to a government department). In the
Maastricht Treaty, it is also explicitly forbidden that the ECB could intervene in and regulate the insurance  field.
21 As an example, the Italian financial market is experiencing a peculiar progressive coincidence between issuers and
financial intermediaries. Data on stock exchange capitalization indicate that the weight of the financial sectors in the
Italian stock market is much higher in 1998 (42.4% of market capitalization) than in other advanced countries (18.2%
in the US, 26.4% in France, 33.7% in Germany, 26.9% in the UK, 18.2% in Japan. Source: IRS, Rapporto sul
Mercato Azionario 1999).
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deposit and bonds issued by banks, and to certain types of life insurance policies). In general financial
products have become increasingly complex, calling for new and enhanced skills in regulatory and
supervisory activities.
III.2 The Regulatory Models.
In each country of the Eurosystem, financial markets regulation has been affected by the
structure and the evolution of the domestic financial system as well as by the legal system in place. In
general regulation was primarily focused on banking intermediaries, given their traditional dominant
role in the financial sector.22  Most of the recent changes have been induced in member countries
under the pressure of the EC directives and of increasing cross-border financial market integration
which first stimulated and then followed the important 1992 single market program. A part form the
member countries’ implicit committment to ensure that single financial sectors were adequately
regulated and supervised, however, no European law deals with the problem of how regulating and
supervising financial markets and intermediaries. As a consequence, the current picture in the Euro
area is that of a combination of the different regulatory approaches described in section 2, but with a
still prominent role for the traditional “institutional” model.  In the European Union, only the nordic
countries (in particular Denmark and Sweden) and recently the UK have moved to a single
supervisor. The central bank is often responsible for banking supervision, even though there are
cases (Austria, Germany, Luxembourg, Finland and partially France) in which this task is assigned to
a separate agency; securities are regulated and supervised by a specialized agency in most countries,
and the same seems to apply to the insurance sector.
 The regulatory agencies also differ in terms of their funding, working and appointment
procedures. In particular, there are cases in which the cost is partly (or totally) beared by the
supervised entities (as the banking supervisor in Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg and Finland) and
cases in which it is mostly coming from the public budget.  Table 1 summarizes the current structure
of supervision in the European Union.
                                         
22 Still in 1998, evaluated in billions of Euro, the nominal value of equity and bond markets in the US was much
higher than in the Eurosystem, with figures of respectively 11,000 and more than 12,000 with respect to about 3,300
and 6,000 in the Euro area. However, in terms of commercial bank assets, the Eurosystem countries summed up to
about 14,000 billions of Euro (1997 data) against the 4,000 of the US. See Lannoo, 2000.
17
Table 1: Supervision in Banking, Securities and Insurance in the EU
Country Banking Securities Insurance
Belgium BS BS I
Denmark U U U
Germany B B,S I
Greece CB S I
Ireland CB CB G
Italy CB* CB, S I
Luxembourg BS BS I
France B,CB B,S I
Spain CB S I
Netherlands CB CB, S I
Portugal CB CB, S I
Austria G G G
Finland BS BS I
Sweden U U U
United KingdomU U U
Sources: ECB (Monthly Bullettin, April 2000), Lannoo (2000).
Legenda: CB: Central Bank, BS: banking and securities supervisor, B: banking supervisor,
S: securities supervisor, I: insurance supervisor, G: government department, U: single financial supervisor.
* In Italy the central bank is also the authority responsible for antitrust in the banking sector.
III.3  Is Domestic Regulation Still Good?
Our previous description of the recent evolution in European financial markets and products
should have made clear that the trend is towards the emergence of Europe as the home market of at
least the most important financial institutions. The single currency will only speed up a naturally
ongoing process to further market integration and towards financial conglomeration. Supervising
groups is not necessarily a minor challenge for regulators.  If it is true that risk diversification might
be at reach, there is also the possibility of excessive risk concentration, expecially when a domestic-
based regulator looses control over the many internationally linked activities of the supervised
entities.  Risks at group level do not always coincide with the sum of individual risks. Moreover,
larger balances allow for more creative accounting.
We think that there is no point in having a common monetary policy and aiming at an always
more integrated financial system in the Euro area while keeping different financial regulations and
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supervising rules in each member country. As a matter of fact, these institutional differences are an
important barrier to further financial integration.  In this field, the principle of minimum
harmonization and mutual recognition, that was originally thought to be able to naturally induce over
time a convergence of regulatory behaviour and more uniform rules, clearly did not work.
Moreover, there is a concrete risk that competition in this area will not even generate the more
efficient outcome: on one side there exists an obvious incentive to promote less demanding domestic
financial regulations and supervision in order to let the own country become more attractive for
running financial business; while on the other side it is not clear who will pay the costs of potential
insolvency following excessive risk taking behavior and financial misconduct in a member country
(see below). Finally, with increasing international banking activities and a European real time gross
settlement system in place (Target), the argument that domestic regulators and supervisors have
better knowledge and can exercise more efficient control becomes day by day less effective (See
Prati and Schinasi, 1998).
Another important point is that no clear tool nor any responsibility to counter and/or manage
the risk of financial instability and crisis has been established in Europe.  The Treaty is silent on this
topic. It is not even evident that the role of lender of last resort will be performed by the ECB, as it
would be desirable being an essential function of a central bank. In fact, this solution will probably
occur only in the case of a widely spread liquidity crisis affecting the whole Euro area.  But what will
follow a liquidity crisis located in a single country?  And what a solvency crisis?
Suppose we face a situation in which a single financial institution located in a member
country is in trouble. What kind of intervention, if any, is currently allowed?  One of the typical
forms of public intervention seems lost, and probably the most natural, that of central bank last resort
loans.  The ECB will not intervene in favour of a single institution, especially if its financial links are
mostly domestic. Also because it could always assign some of the responsibility for the crisis to the
domestic financial regulator-supervisor. The domestic central bank can not intervene by providing
funds without an explicit authorization by the ECB. In this case, it will have to convince the latter
that the institution is facing a liquidity and not a solvency crisis, according to the old Bagehot's
doctrine,  and / or that the risk of potential spread and contagion of the crisis is high.23 This requires
time and resources. The other two traditional instruments, bail out through a safety net provided by
the banking system or through the government budget will ultimately shift the burden on the
shoulders of domestic taxpayers, especially in the framework established in the Stability and Growth
Pact. Given the current level of taxes in Europe, this is hardly an optimal solution.
                                         
23 See Freixas et al. (1999), De Cecco (1999) and Bruni and de Boisseu (2000).
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We think that a much higher degree of co-ordination in the field of financial regulation and
prudential supervision is both desirable and needed in the EMU. Our view is not limited to the
banking system but embraces all financial intermediaries. A somehow good example of international
cooperation can already be found in the banking supervision, with the Basle Committee working on a
wide range of topics with no formal by-laws, but a very strong leadership. Furthermore, at the EU
level there exist many Institutional arrangements for the regulation and supervision of the financial
sector: the most important are the Banking Advisory Committee and the Insurance Committee, both
capable of Comitology powers (European Commission, 2000). Comitology refers to the delegation
of implementing powers by the Council to the Commission for the execution of EU legislation:
representatives of the member States, acting through Committees called “comitology committees”,
assist the Commission in the execution of the implementing powers conferred on it (Wise Men,
2000).
On the contrary, the securities supervision has succeeded in establishing neither a similar long
record of international rule-making nor a Securities Committee capable of comitology powers. In a
world of complete mobility of capital and financial services, where institutions and markets operate
without frontiers, supervision should operate at the same level, that is to say, it must be structured
internationally24 . The European supervisory system would gain both in consistency and effectiveness
if all stability oriented rules, all transparency oriented rules and all competition oriented rules for all
types of financial institutions were either issued or (better) coordinated by distinct independent
agencies at the Euro level.
IV.  REGULATION BY OBJECTIVE IN THE EURO AREA.
In section 2, we argued in favour of the regulatory model by objectives. According to this
view, while continuing to assign to the central bank the objective of price and macroeconomic
stability, a separate agency should be in charge of micro stability. This should supervise the stability
of the entire financial market and of single financial intermediaries whether in banking, securities or
insurance25 (authorizations; professional registers; supervision in the area of information, regulations
and inspections of intermediaries and conglomerates; other matters regarding stability; crises
                                         
24 This does not necessarily lead to the death of national securities supervisor and the creation of a European SEC (see
Lannoo 1999, Karmel 1999, Onado, 1999), even though such hypothesis could become realistic in the medium run
(see the Financial Services Action Plan and Wise Men, 2000).
25 We view as somehow problematic the different regulation currently given in most countries to life insurance firms,
particularly when they act purely as financial intermediaries. As a matter of fact, the life insurance industry,
throughout contracts such as unit and index-linked schemes, has been gradually losing its original distinctiveness. We
think it should no longer be regulated as a different function from banking and financial investment, nor having its
own regulator.
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management). We think that this authority should also manage deposit insurance and the investor
compensation scheme.26 This authority should cooperate with the central bank, which remain in
charge of monetary policy and lender of last resort function, in supervising security settlement and
payment systems and clearing houses; it could be charged with responsibility over financial
instruments in wholesale markets, with particular regard to government bonds and derivatives.
An authority responsible for transparency and investor protection should supervise disclosure
requirements and the proper behavior of intermediaries and the orderly conduct of trading in all
financial intermediation activities performed by banking, securities, and life insurance intermediaries
(including discipline and control in the area of transparency in contracts). Moreover, this authority
would be assigned powers in the area of misleading advertising by financial intermediaries. Finally, it
should control macro-transparency in financial markets (including the discipline of insider trading,
takeovers and public offers).
A fourth authority (including the central bank) should guarantee fair competition, and should
avoid abuses of dominant position and limit dangerous concentrations in banking, security and
insurance sectors.  A non-binding opinion of the authority for stability might be contemplated in
certain instances.
A sketch of this “four-peak” model for financial regulation follows (Figure 1).
Figure 1.  A 4-Peak Model for Financial Regulation
 ECB- NCB       Authority for SupervisionAuthority for Transparency   Antitrust
(macrostability
and monetary
policy)                Banks             Investment Firms and Funds     Life Insurance
In this paragraph, we will present an institutional proposal to modify the current regulatory
architecture of the Eurosystem financial sector which is a simple application of the above model. We
think that this could be considered a good candidate to solve some problematic issues regarding
financial stability in the Euro area and the need for more coordinated transparency and investor
protection rules. Of course, we are aware that it is not easy to structure and create such an integrated
system of rules and institutions in the EU, that it will require time, resources, political support and a
                                         
26 In fact, often the domestic agencies for deposit protection have no regulatory and supervisory powers at all, and they
simply act as the cash management department of other regulating institutions when reimboursing depositors and
investors. There are clearly cost reductions that could be achieved by their elimination.
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widespread collaborative attitude. Nevertheless, we hope at least to contribute to the current
discussion in a constructive way. 27
A first issue to tackle is whether financial regulation in the Euro area should be fully
centralized at the European level, or only better harmonized but still maintained at a regional
dimension.
Many arguments support the view of centralizing and unifying financial regulation in the
Eurosystem.  Increasing integration among financial markets goes along with implicit or exlicit
mergers among exchanges and intermediaries, and involves dual and cross-border offerings and
listings.  An integrated supervision on markets and intermediaries would be valuable in a scenario
dominated by conglomerates and characterized by the expansion of electronic communication
networks, market manipulation and trades on the net. At the same time, there is the need for
enforcement at European level.
However, the feasibility and opportunity of a European centralized solution is diminished by
the observation that the Euro area might be too large to be controlled by a central agency, that many
different rules are still in place with respect to commercial codes, company laws, corporate
governance schemes, failure procedures and so on. The EU directives, when they exist, do only
establish a common floor; and even with a single currency and a common monetary policy, different
fiscal policies are still in place, and taxation of both financial services and other items is not
homogeneous in the Eurosystem. Some form of national enforcement is probably still needed.
Hence, we propose to establish a European System of Financial Regulators (ESFR),
structured similarly to the ESCB, and organized accordingly to the model of regulation by objective.
A European Central Authority, separated by the ECB, should be at the centre of the system for each
objective of regulation. In a first stage (3 years?), these authorities would harmonize and coordinate
financial regulation in member countries, design common principles and guidelines for prudential
supervision and set out appropriate disclosure instruments and requirements. They should sponsor
the necessary institutional change at domestic level leading to merging and re-organization of
supervisory and regulatory powers in the financial sector of each member country. At the end of the
process, in each country there will be just one national agency responsible for each objective of
financial market regulation. This national agency will participate to the definition of the general
strategies and principles of financial regulation in the area, becoming a member of the ESFR. It will
                                         
27 On these topics see also Padoa Schioppa, 1999; Lannoo, 1999; Vives, 1999.
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be responsible for the implementation in the domestic country of both the rules and the supervisory
duties agreed upon at the Euro level.28
This reform calls for establishing two new European Agencies, one responsible for the
microeconomic stability (“European Financial Supervision Authority”) and one for transparency in
the market, investor protection and disclosure requirements (“European Authority for Market
Transparency”) of all financial intermediaries. These two central agencies should co-ordinate the
different domestic agencies in each member country. A part form this vertical form of coordination,
cooperation would be also desirable horizontallly, at both the European and national levels. This
coordination, and resolution of eventual controversies, could be provided by special Commissions
for the Supervision of the Financial System (as in the Corrigan Report - Corrigan 1987) established
at the European Commission and at national Treasuries. These commissions would be the natural
place for activities involving proposals and consultation concerning measures regarding financial
market regulation.
No antitrust power will be given to any member of the ESFR, so as to avoid the trade-off
between competition on one side and stability and transparency on the other. Moreover, agencies
responsible for supervising market competition do exist at both Euro and domestic levels. We think
that it would be wise to transform in a third separate and independent central agency the EU
Antitrust DG. This will then coordinate and promote the harmonized activities of domestic Antitrust
agencies. In each member state, the national Antitrust agency will safeguard competition in all
economic sectors.
Our suggested 4 - peak model for financial regulation in Europe is sketched in figure 2.
                                         
28 Both the national and the central European levels of financial supervisors should exist, given the current level of
harmonization in the financial market legislation, which is far from complete, in particular with respect to taxation,
accounting rules and banking crises management.
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Figure 2:  European System of Financial Regulation
Coordination Committee
European System of   European System of   European System for   European System
Central Banks Financial Supervisors    Market Transparencyfor Competition
European
Level             ECB           EFSA    EAMT          European Antitrust Agency
                                           (BIS ? Basle Committee?)       (FESCO?)
Domestic                                 Coordination Committee
Level
    Central Bank  Financial Supervision Authority         Authority for            Antitrust Authority
          Market Transparency
We are aware that our proposed architecture is very ambitious and requires indeed a substantial
amount of coordination among the different authorities. Another important obstacle is the
institutional and political resistance of the existing national bodies that would not easily accept to see
their powers diminished or even abolished.
For such reasons, although less satisfying from a theoretical point of view, a second best solution
could be the creation of a single regulator, by merging the financial supervision authority and the
market transparency agency into a single one. This kind of three-peak model could still be a good,
and more practical solution to implement, especially in the medium run. In such a scheme, the single
European Central Agency for financial market regulation would cooperate with the ECB for the
purpose of macroeconomic stability. It would also organize and coordinate the work of the various
domestic agencies, which in different countries could be either specialized by objective or responsible
for both market transparency and stability as the FSA in the UK.
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V. CONCLUSIONS.
In this paper we argued that financial market regulation should be re-designed and
harmonized in Europe according to a regulatory model by “objectives” or “finalities”. This would
call for assigning to three distinct and independent agencies (separated by, but coordinated with the
central bank) all supervisory powers and regulatory responsibilities in financial markets and on
financial intermediaries, regardless of these being insurance companies, banks or investment firms.
One agency should be responsible for financial microstability, another for transparency and
disclosure requirements, and the third for protection of competitive features in the markets.
We are in favour of the establishment in the Euro area of two new European financial
regulation agencies, each formally separated by the ECB. These agencies should be responsible for
the comprehensive co-ordination of both legislation and execution of regulation in financial markets:
the first European central agency should be responsible for the microeconomic stability of all
intermediaries, while the second for transparency and disclosure requirements. The third objective of
guaranteeing competition in financial (and nonfinancial) markets is already safeguarded by having the
Antitrust General Direction of the European Commission plus the domestic agencies. It would be
wise to transform in a central and independent European agency the EU Antitrust General Direction.
The latter and the two newly created central agencies will be at the centre of three European Systems
of Financial Regulators, each one structured similarly and working in connection to the ESCB,
thereby requiring active participation of national agencies in member countries. A 4 - peak regulatory
model “by objective” would be in place in the Euro Area as well as in each member country.
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